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The Methodology of Comparative Law
Edward J. Eberle*

I. INTRODUCTION
In our increasingly globally linked world, comparative law
needs to take on an ever more important role. With the rise of
important new developments over the last thirty years, like the
proliferation of the computer and the internet, global capital
markets which begin in Asia and end in the United States, and
the mutual trade in commodities, like oil, foodstuffs or metals, we
are linked in important common ways.
The computer, and
especially its generation of the internet, has made us, in effect, a
global village. Still, of course, there are differences among areas
of the world and countries, notwithstanding the common linkages
that connect us. And so, that brings us to the topic at hand:
assessing the role and methodology of comparative law so that we
can come up with a sound methodological framework to better
understand the role of law in different countries. This will serve
as a way of promoting insight and knowledge and, maybe, some
degree of harmonization over critical issues or, at least, a measure
of common understanding. The gathering of knowledge obtained
through comparative law can be a vital portal to a foreign culture.
The insights gathered can usefully illuminate the inner workings
of a foreign legal system. And these insights can be applied to our
own legal culture, helping illuminate different perspectives that
. Visiting Professor, Boston University School of Law and
Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School
of Law. Copyright by Edward J. Eberle, 2008. All rights reserved. This
article is based on excerpts from my article, The Method and Role of
ComparativeLaw, 8 WASH.U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 451 (2009). I would like to
thank Vivian Curran, Jay Krishnan, Tim Kuhner, and Jim Whitman for their
helpful comments on this article.
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may yield deeper understanding of our legal order.
First, some insight into comparative law. The essence of
comparative law is the act of comparing the law of one country to
that of another. Most frequently, the basis for comparison is a
foreign law juxtaposed against the measure of one's own law. But,
of course, the comparison can be broader: more than two laws,
more than law, more than written words.
The key act in comparison is looking at one mass of legal data
in relationship to another and then assessing how the two lumps
of legal data are similar and how they are different. The essence
of comparison is then aligning similarities and differences
between data points, and then using this exercise as a measure to
obtain understanding of the content and range of the data points.
Here we need to focus quite carefully on the similarities and
differences among the data points derived from the different legal
systems.1 What is the substance of the data point? How does it
diverge from the point it was compared to? What are the nature
of the divergences? What do the divergences and similarities
reveal? On what data are the revelations based?
It is not enough simply to compare words on the page. Law
sits within a culture. Law both drives and is influenced by the
culture of the home country. So, we must look beneath the law as
written formally in text. We need to excavate the underlying
structure of law to understand better what the law really is and
how it actually functions within a society. To do this, we need to
explore the substructural forces that influence law. These can be
things like religion, history, geography, morals, custom,
philosophy or ideology, among other driving forces. Professor
Grossfeld and I have referred to these forces as "invisible
powers." 2 Rodolfo Sacco terms these underlying influences "legal
formants," influences that help drive the formation of law. 3 The
point, simply stated, is that to get a complete understanding of
law, we need to look fully at how law operates within a culture.
1 John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617,
620 (1998).
2
See Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Patterns of Order in
Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 291, 291 (2003).
3 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to
Comparative Law II, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 384-85 (1991).
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To do this, we need to learn to look at the law of a foreign
country carefully. Critical here is the need to free ourselves from
our own biases derived from our own culture or what Vivian
Curran refers to as a "cognitive lock-in." 4 This entails, first,
immersion in the culture under review. And second, once the
culture has been studied and the results gathered, we need to step
outside that culture and view the data carefully and objectively.
We should learn to apply the skills of a scientist; looking cleareyed and straightforwardly at the legal data points derived from
foreign
cultures, and then carefully
assessing
them,
understanding the legal concepts as written and as influenced by
the substructural elements. To do this well, we should look to the
skills of an anthropologist, learning the techniques of
understanding foreign cultures in a neutral, unbiased way. That
is one way we can rid ourselves of our cultural biases, whether
from our own or the foreign culture under review.
As we reassess the methodology of comparative law, we need
also to reassess the purposes and missions served by comparative
law.
Generally, comparative law has been employed as a
discipline to understand foreign law and culture. It has also been
used to better understand our own culture through the process of
comparison to another culture.
In the post-World War II
emergence of comparative law, especially in the United States due
to the transplantation of the European emigres from the Hitler
era, 5 comparative law has sometimes entailed a search for
universal principles of law that transcend culture, primarily in the
field of private law, 6 but with elements transforming public law as
4 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and
Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1998).
5 Perhaps the Hitler emigres' quest was based on a pursuit of natural
law- principles that would stand over and above human nature as an
extrinsic code of conduct to regulate behavior. Perhaps commitment to such
universal principles would ward off the demons of base human nature, as
experienced in the Hitler and Stalin time of these emigres' history.
6
For example, we might also point to the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) sponsored movement toward
harmonization of private law, including the highly successful Convention on
International Sale of Goods (CISG) that bridges civil and common law
contract principles. Unification of private law is also "a task undertaken by
the Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)." Sompong
Sucharitkul, Unification of Private Law and Codification of International
Law, 3 UNIFORM L. REV. 693, 693 (1998).
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well. 7 These are all important missions of comparative law.

But now, we must ask, should comparative law step outside
its traditional missions and embark on larger pursuits? For
example, should comparative law play a larger role in shedding
light and, perhaps, helping solve important public policy
questions, questions that often transcend national borders? Some
important concerns to consider might include informational and
data privacy, consumer protection, antitrust law or intellectual
property, to mention just a few. Or comparative law could be used
to illuminate issues of great importance to the human person.
Traditionally, the focus here has been on private law, including
subjects like contract, property, and choice of law. But now there
is a burgeoning field of comparative constitutional law. A deeper
comparative focus on constitutional orders might lead us to
question and reexamine core principles of the constitutional order,
like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equality, or structural
matters like separation of powers.
Comparative law should also focus more intently on
nonwestern legal orders. Especially crucial for consideration are

the legal cultures of Asia, most notably China and India, rising
superpowers, and Japan, already an important player in the
7 Here we might note, for example, the erection of the United Nations
and its many missions and treaties, such as the United Nations Convention
on Human Rights or the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the
Child. Or we might consider the International Bill of Rights that consists of
three documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Certainly the quest for
common, unifying principles has been a goal of post World War II
international law.
We can find the notion of human rights in all societies and at all
times, in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa, in antique as well as
in modern Chinese philosophy, in Hinduism, Buddhism,
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The idea of human dignity is
common to all these concepts, which emphasize different values
according to the different conditions and diverse societies in which
the human beings happen to be living. Human dignity and tolerance
constitute the basic core of human rights.
Sompong Sucharitkul, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in
InternationalLaw, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 305, 306 (1986-87).
For an evaluation of the role of foreign law in the United States, see
Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Exploring the Role of
Foreignand InternationalLaw in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L.

REV. 1389 (2007).
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world. Focus should also turn more intently on indigenous people,
which might yield insight into human behavior unencumbered by
the complications of the modern world. Evaluation of older
cultures in place before the rise of legal systems can yield
important information into the basic elements and structure of
modern societies. Looking at ourselves in the mirror in these
ways can shed useful insight that might reveal important ideas,
norms, rules or principles, forcing a reevaluation that may
improve the social order or, alternatively, may lead us to confirm
the tenets of our own legal system.
In taking on this new mission, comparative law can learn a lot
from other disciplines that have arisen in the last thirty years to
challenge conventional ways of thinking.
Some important
disciplines to consider include the wide range of critical legal
studies, law and economics, law and sociology, or feminism. Like
these disciplines, comparative law must also stand on its own as
an independent, scientific discipline. 8 With a keen focus on
comparative law, we can reassess the underlying principles that
make up the legal order and determine what, if anything, needs to
be done, nationally, regionally or internationally.
To accomplish these goals, Part II will lay out the
methodology of comparative law. My proposal for comparative
methodology consists of these steps: Rule 1 consists of acquiring
the skills of a comparativist. That skill calls for immersion in the
culture under review, linguistic knowledge, and the application of
neutral, objective, and evaluative skills. Rule 2 will apply
comparative skill to evaluate the external law, consisting of the
law as written or stated. Here we must do a close assessment of
the similarities and differences of the law of different countries
under review. Rule 3 will involve applying the same methodology
to the internal law, consisting of the law that lies beneath external
law yet has important influences on the formation of law. Finally,
Rule 4 will involve assembling the results of comparative
investigation in order to determine what we can learn from a
foreign legal system and how that insight might reflect on our own
Comparative law must "develop[] into a coherent and intellectually
convincing discipline." Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of
Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J.
s

COMP. L. 671, 673 (2002).
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legal system.
II. COMPARATIVE LAW METHODOLOGY

First, it is important to get a sense about comparative law
and its methodology. As applied to law, the act of comparison
provides insight into the other law, our own law and, as
importantly, our own perceptions and intuitions, a self-reflection
that often can yield insight into our view of the law. 9 Do we see
law as only rules - commands that channel us along prescribed
paths? Do we see law as filtered through the lens of our own law,
native predispositions associated with our home territory? Is this
a form of cognitive lock-in which colors or even blinds us? This
would, of course, be quite natural, as we all reflect our own
acculturations. Or do we see law as only illusion? Do we sense a
disjunction between law as written versus law as applied or as
practiced within a given culture? Is there some operation code or
hidden formant we are missing that actually drives the pattern of
law?
Perhaps we are not accustomed to asking such questions.
Most of us are situated within our own native culture, and within
that culture we work with the common clay of material that we
have grown up with and are accustomed to. We know our own
culture well, have learned to appreciate it and may assume it to be
the best. Sometimes we may be right. But we are likely wrong
just as often. Inhabiting only our own legal system can be
insulating and distorting, which brings us back to comparative
law and its purpose. Comparative law offers us avenues by which
to access other, foreign patterns of thought and organization
different from those we are familiar with. We learn a different
language, a different legal culture - what we might call different
"patterns of order that shape people, institutions, and the society
in a jurisdiction." 10
Sensing and appreciating the difference of other legal cultures
can be enriching. We might sense commonalities in legal systems,
such as rules, categories, or patterns of thought or order that
resonate across national borders and sit also in our own law. Are
9 Parts of this article are based on Edward
Law, 13 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP.L. 93 (2007).

10

Grossfeld & Eberle, supra note 2, at 292.

J. Eberle, Comparative
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there common archetypes embedded within multiple legal
systems? If so, what does this mean? Does this lead to a quest for
universal principles of law? The pursuit of common principles
might form a bridge between different cultures, facilitating
mutual cooperation and understanding, if not, hopefully, a coming
together of peoples. But is the quest for universality simply
quixotic? Unfortunately, there is often a disjunction between
ideals subscribed to and behavior actually undertaken. That is
the messy reality of law. Law can only do so much. We are still
left with the baseness of the common clay of humanity. Does this
mean that a legal system is dependent on its own cultural setting?
Or do external influences-perhaps a transplant-drive a national
legal order? Or is it both - that is, a legal system consists of both
internal and external influences?
These are all important
questions to ask.
And that brings us to the purpose of
comparative law: looking to other, foreign legal systems for
illumination and insight in the hope that wisdom and
understanding are to be gained, either from a foreign legal system
or our own.
Turning now to the question of methodology, comparative law
must have a sound methodology to operate as a legal science. In
this part of the article, my aim is to set out a sound methodology
that can be applied carefully, neutrally, and vigorously so that
comparative law can fulfill its mission as a critical legal science.
Let me describe the methodology. There are four critical parts to
comparative methodology. The first part, (Rule 1) is acquiring the
skills of a comparativist in order to evaluate law clearly,
objectively, and neutrally. The second part, (Rule 2) is evaluation
of the law as it is expressed concretely, in words, action, or orality.
We can refer to this as the external law. Once we get an
understanding of the law as actually stated, we can move on to the
third part, (Rule 3) of the methodology an evaluation of how the
law actually operates within a culture. We might refer to this as
law in action or the internal law. Law in action is quite
important, even, to western culture, as often the words in the text
take on a different meaning as applied. Law in action is even
more critical for nonwestern cultures, as here the law may be
more a result of tradition, custom, or orality. To do this, we need
to examine the underlying substructural elements within the
culture that drive and influence the law. After we have evaluated
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the law as stated and the law in action, we can assemble our data,
(Rule 4) and conclude with comparative observations that can
shed light on both a foreign and our own legal culture. Let us now
turn to outlining comparative law methodology.
Rule 1: The Skills of a Comparativist
It is the aim of comparative law to understand the legal rules
and patterns of order that drive a given society. To do this, we
need to develop critical reasoning skills that are applied in a
scientific and neutral manner." Here we need to shed our builtin, native bias or "cognitive lock-in" so that we can review the data
objectively. This will call upon us to engage in the exotic:
exploring and explaining the substructural, underlying forces that
influence and form law. For natives of a legal system, this is a
question of acculturation. Being a product of a culture, we
intuitively sense the hidden forces that play out below the
external manifestation of law. But in foreign culture, this is more
difficult. Here we must call upon the tools of the anthropologist or
archeologist: studying the underlying substrata of data that lie
within a culture. By employing these skills, we can better
understand a foreign culture.12
For the comparativist, this means we must engage in
"cultural immersion," as Vivian Curran advocates. This "requires
immersion into the political, historical, economic and linguistic
contexts that molded the legal system, and in which the legal
system operates. It requires an explanation of various cultural
11 See, e.g.,

JEROME KIRK & MARC

L.

MILLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 10-19 (1986); COMPARING NATIONS: CONCEPTS,
STRATEGIES, SUBSTANCE (Mattei Dogan & Ali Kazancigil eds., 1994); MATTEI
DOGAN & DOMINIQUE PELASSY, How To COMPARE NATIONS: STRATEGIES IN

COMPARATIVE POLITICS 3-37 (Chatham House 1990) (1984). Accord Gfinter
Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons:Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411, 439, 443 (1985) (we need to undertake a critical self-

examination).

12
Reitz, supra note 1, at 631. As Reitz observes, a comparativist must
understand the forms of legal reasoning and value judgments that are
reflected in the general pattern of legal reasoning. Id. at 632. To do this, we
need to understand the country's history and "philosophical and religious
traditions" and comparativists need "strong linguistic skills and maybe even
the skills of anthropological field study in order to collect information about
foreign legal systems at first hand." Id. at 631-32. See also KIRK & MILLER,
supra note 11, at 10-19; Dogan & Kazancigil, eds., supranote 11, at 14-27.
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*.".."13 We must also consider the underlying
mentalities .
concepts, beliefs and reasons that underlie law, what we might
call the legal mind or framework of legal philosophy that helps

drive and structure law. 14

Law really cannot be understood

without understanding the culture on which it sits. And to
understand the culture we need to employ the tools of acute
observation, linguistic skill and immersion in the milieu and social
setting. For example, can we really understand the United States
Constitution without an appreciation of the influence of the
Enlightenment, natural law or Republican or English Whig
theory? Why, after all, do we refer to it as our "higher law?"
Once we have uncovered the cultural context of law, then we
can set out the data we have gathered. Here we need to take two
approaches to the culture under study. First, we must assess the
data within its cultural context through the knowledge we have
gathered through cultural immersion. After we have completed a
careful consideration of law situated in culture, we must step back
and distance ourselves from the legal order under review,
decanting it like a fine wine, and then turn to a careful
assessment of the data. 15 To do this, we must strive for neutrality
and a healthy skepticism so that we can view a foreign culture
objectively, in an honest and clear way. 16 Here it is important to

13

Curran, Cultural Immersion, supra note 4, at 51; see also Vivian

Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's Potential for Broadening
Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 659, 661 (1998).
14
William Ewald, The JurisprudentialApproach to Comparative Law:
A Field Guide to "Rats," 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 704-05 (1998); William

Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143

U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1973-74 (1994-1995) (observing that we need to compare
law from the interior point of view so that we can see how lawyers think in
their own legal system). See Nicholas H.D. Foster, Company Law Theory in

Comparative Perspective: England and France, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 616
(2000) (quoting Pierre Legrand who calls this the mentalitg of lawyers). See

also Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change
in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 647, 652 (1998) ("Like the study of
other religions, comparative law will help us understand how another person
conceives of the world and how law contributes to and reflects the culture of a
country.").
15
DOGAN & PELASSY, supra note 11, at 169; Demleitner, supra note 14,
at 647 (observing that we need to be careful that we do not misinterpret legal
phenomena). See also Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 412 (observing that we
need to make conscious effort to achieve distance from our assumptions).
16 Reitz, supra note 1, at 622.
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free ourselves, as best as we can, of cultural bias, both with
respect to our own culture and the one under review. 17 A complete
cultural immersion or objective evaluation may not be possible,
but we must do the best we can.
After we have completed this investigation, we must then
employ skills of translation; translating one world view into
another. Employing the skills of translation is not easy. We need
to be extremely careful and not assume that an idea or word will
translate perfectly from one culture to another.
We must
recognize the meaning of the idea or word in its own culture,
explain its underlying cultural context, and then translate that
meaning as best we can to another legal culture, whether our own
or a different foreign culture. Translation will call upon us to
explain the underlying context of the culture the idea or word is
situated in. Translation calls for understanding the multiple
semiotic systems and linguistic contexts that situate ideas, and
then determining how to adjust and transfer over that particular
world view into that of another. If we do this well, translation can
be a bridge to connect cultures.18 Or translation can illuminate
disjunction between legal orders. Illuminating either connection
or disjunction among cultures can yield valuable insights.
These tools will help us to learn and appreciate that law is not
just the words on the page or the chant by the sage. Employing
these skills can lead us to new insight and new perspectives on
foreign law. By gaining a greater understanding of the underlying
socio-philosophic context that both reflects and helps mold law, we
can obtain a fuller understanding of law. This more wide-eyed
view of law will lead to new perceptions of traditional views of
law-law as rules, as categories, as legally enacted measures. In
fact, we can truly only understand law by examining the visible
stated law and the substructural, underlying phenomena that
form the invisible pattern of law. We can thereby gain a fuller
appreciation of law; not just law, but law as it sits within culture.
This more comprehensive use of comparative law can offer fuller
17
Demleitner, supra note 14, at 653 (observing that we need to be
careful not to be trapped by our own stereotypes and "built-in assumptions
about other systems"). See also Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 412-14

(observing we need to rethink our own biases and de-center our point of
.view).
18

See Curran, Dealing in Difference, supra note 13, at 661.
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access to different and alternative patterns of thought.
Rule 2: Evaluating External Law, as Written or Stated
The essence of comparative law is comparing the law of one
country against that of another country. The act of comparison
requires a careful consideration of the similarities and differences
between multiple legal data points, and then using these
measurements to understand the content and range of the legal
material under observation. 19 To do this, we must look quite
carefully at the legal data points under review, assess and
understand their content, meaning, and application. Here our
focus will be on external law: law as written, stated or otherwise
made concrete. Words as written are important, but not enough.
We must also understand what meaning the words have within
the context of the case, statute, or other legal norm. That is, how
does the legal rule fit within the broader framework of the legal
system? After we have undertaken the careful evaluation of the
legal data points, we must proceed to the next step of comparative
methodology: comparing and contrasting the similarities and
differences between the legal points under review in the different
legal systems. First, we can focus on similarities. How are the
multiple data points similar? Is it by word, rule, meaning,
application, impact or some other underlying basis? Or is it
because of the context of the legal norm, a functional meaning or
something else? We need to understand the similarities between
the legal data points under review. The meaning of words and
norms can vary with their setting. What provides the basis for the
similarity? What is the meaning of the similarity? How does the
similarity translate across legal cultures? These are just some of
the questions to pose.
In the next step of Rule 2, we must apply the same technique
to assessing differences among legal data points. How and in
what way are the legal data points different? Is the difference
based on words, on context, on functionality or something else?
What is the concrete meaning of the differences? What do the
differences reveal? How do you translate the differences across
19 As Giinter Frankenberg observes, we need to employ a "close
attention to detail." Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 412. See also Reimann,
supra note 8, at 686.
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legal cultures? Only a close assessment of the legal data points
will reveal the underlying differences among legal systems.
Once we have undertaken the systematic study of the
similarities and differences between legal data points, we can
move onto the next step: closely evaluating what is similar and
what is different among the data points and why. Here we need to
investigate and explore the reasons for the similarities and
differences and then evaluate their significance within their legal
culture. 20 We need to compare and contrast the points so that we
can arrive at a fully considered and understood conception of the
object under study. We need, then, to record the data we have
considered, outlining the substantive content of the data, and then
pointing out how the data compares and contrasts. Once we have
recorded the results of our investigation, we can begin to pose
questions.
For example, why are the legal rules or data points similar or
different? What does that reflect-a rule, law, application or
context? How do they apply? What are the reasons for the
substance of the data point? What does the information tell us
about the legal culture? Can we learn something from this? Have
we looked only at the law in the books? Is there a difference
between the law in the books and the law in action? How do we
study the law in action? And by that study can we help fill in the
gaps between law in the books and law in action so that we get a
fuller study of the law as it actually operates within its legal
culture. These are just some of the questions that need to be
addressed. I am sure there are others. The end result of our
systematic application of Rule 2 is that we will uncover the
concrete meaning of the legal data point under review. We can
then turn to the next step of comparative law methodology.
Rule 3: EvaluatingInternal Law
Turning to the third part of comparative law methodology, we
must understand that not all law is external or overt or readily
identifiable on the surface.
A comparativist is like an
archaeologist: mining the mass of data of a foreign source in
search of uncovering patterns of thought and order that undergird
20 John Reitz makes a similar point in his outstanding article, How to
Do ComparativeLaw. See Reitz, supra note 1, at 626-27.
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and form a legal culture. The work of the comparativist is, by
definition, exotic: studying the legal culture to see by what rules it
is run, how they function, how effective they are, how they
influence and form the culture. We thereby learn much about
rules, but as importantly, about the culture. Why are the rules
formed this way? Do the rules reflect cultural predispositions? Do
the rules influence the culture? What does the culture consist of?
How do the elements of the culture influence the law?
To get to the bottom of these questions, we must understand
what law is. Many of us think of law as rules, and this is surely
We can look to constitutions, statutes, codes,
part of law.
regulations, cases or other sources to find concrete statements of
rules. We might think of this part of law as law in its external
External law is that which is the readily
manifestation.
identifiable form of law. In the western tradition, most of external
law is written; the power of the written word-sola scripta: written
words convey authority and respect, or so they have come to be
And westerners are
within the western cultural tradition.
accustomed to thinking of law as written; the words on the page
convey most of the meaning one seeks. We only need to deal with
words and then translate their meaning. That is, again, the object
of our evaluation in Rule 2.
But not all external law is written. A second, deeper part of
law lies beneath the surface and is less visible. These are the
underlying forces that operate within a society to help form and
influence law and give it substance. We might call this the
"invisible" dimension of law. Not that this dimension is wholly
unknown or unrecognizable, but more that this dimension of law
is one we tend to assume, take for granted, or perceive just
dimly. 21

Or we might think of these invisible patterns as

underlying cryptotypes-"the pattern to be revealed" - or legal
formants-"non-verbalized rule[s]" - or "implicit patterns." 22 Or we
might think of this dimension as "substructural, often
unarticulated, categorizations ... ,"23 We might refer to this
dimension of law as internal: forces that operate beneath the
surface of external law, but which infuse the law with meaningful
21
22
23

Grossfeld & Eberle, supra note 2, at 294.
Sacco, supra note 3, at 385.
Curran, Cultural Immersion, supra note 4,at 51.
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content. Examples of internal forces might be custom, history,
philosophy, 26
language,
geography, 25
ethics,
religion, 24
interpretation or translation. There is a deeper dimension to law
than that which manifests itself overtly. We must pay close
attention to law in all of its manifestations.
We all have a tendency to seize upon the readily identifiable
and ascribe meaning to it. But that is a mistake. The internal
dimension of law can exert powerful meaning on legal culture. We
need to look at law fully, considering all aspects so that we can
reach a better understanding of how law actually functions within
a society. Law, of course, is like a language; in reality, it is a legal
language. But as with a foreign language, in order truly to
understand language, we must understand the cultural context on
which it sits and which helped form it. Only then can we
translate accurately true meaning from one legal system to
24
See, e.g., Joachim J. Savelsberg, Religion, Historical Contingencies,
and Institutional Conditions of Criminal Punishment: The German Case and
Beyond, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 373 (2004).
25
For example, England is an island country, now long united as the

United Kingdom. Due to English isolation, English law formed much of its
core on its own, reflecting its traditions. By contrast, France is part of
continental Europe. Thus, France looked more frequently to its fellow
Europeans for borrowings. For example, "the socigtg 6 responsabilitglimitge.
• . was imported almost wholesale from Germany, partly in response to the
wishes of the business community to have an equivalent to the English
private company." Foster, supra note 14, at 613-14. See also Ewald,
JurisprudentialApproach, supra note 14, at 702 ("the relevant 'context'
[might include] the economics of the society, or its political structure, or social
arrangements, or even (as in Montesquieu) its geography and climate.").
26
French legal thought, for example, often reflects the Cartesian
method of breaking an argument into two segments. Foster, supra note 14,
at 604. There is a "greater [emphasis] of theory and categorization in French
legal thinking and the construction of a typical Cartesian, dualist
[framework] .

.

. as opposed to the lack of importance accorded to theory in

English law." Id. at 616. Of course, this would make sense, as Rene
Descartes is French and English common law is based on practical solutions
given the exigencies of the case, the origin of what became the common law.
Law and economics has had a major influence on contract and
antitrust law in the United States. Given some strong similarities of the
United Kingdom to the United States, law and economics has influenced
English law as well. Id. at 619. However, law and economics does not have
much of an impact in continental European countries, reflecting deep
underlying structural differences in culture. See, e.g., Kristoffel Grechenig &
Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American
Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism,31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 295 (2008).
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27

another.
A range of forces lie beneath the external law, and a main
mission of comparative law is to offer the tools by which to
examine the full range of forces that comprise the internal
dimension of law so that we can understand how law actually
functions within a society. Law sits on the surface of culture, is
vested with meaning by the culture and, in turn, vests the culture
with meaning. Accordingly, we must look at law in a more
complete way as: 1) external law; 2) internal law; and 3) the
culture on which law sits. We are not studying just law, but legal
culture as well. The study of law is as important as the study of
culture. Only this way can we obtain a more complete view of law,
allowing us to impart truer understanding.
Rule 4: Determining ComparativeObservations
The final step in comparative law methodology is assembling
27 Translation of.legal concepts from one country to another can be
difficult. For example, consider the observations made by Nicholas H. D.

Foster in his article, Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective:
England and France. Consider the term for corporations. Older English
usage used the term corporation, which is the common usage in North
America. Foster, supra note 14, at 578. But more modern terminology uses
the term "company" as the general term for business organizations. Id. In
France, the usage is socigtg, although in old French law, the term was
compagnies. Id. Likewise, the English term of contract "is far from coterminous with French 'contrat."' Id. at 596. As Professor Foster observes, it
is hard to find an exact equivalence between legal ideas. Id. at 578. For
example, comparing England and the United States - two countries with
much shared traditions - concerning corporate governance, there can be
significant differences, "principally residing in the lack of a United Kingdom
counterpart to the United States tension between notions of centralizing,
bureaucratic, control and democratic freedom." Id. at 617.
As John Reitz observes:
Here the comparatist comes face to face with the enigma of
translation. In one sense every term can be translated because there
are things in each legal system that are roughly the functional
equivalent of things in the other legal system. In another sense
nothing can be translated because the equivalents are different in
ways that matter at least for some purposes. At a minimum,
generally equivalent terms in each language often have different
associated meanings, like, for example, "fairness" and loyaute.
Reitz, supra note 1, at 620-2 1; see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 10-11 (2d ed. University of Georgia Press
1993) (1974); Reimann, supra note 8, at 678 (noting that legal transplants
assume new meaning in a different culture).
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the results of our investigation. Here we must focus on the legal
data points under review. What is the significance of the data?
What have we learned? Has our investigation of a foreign legal
system shed light into the operation and meaning of the foreign
legal system? Can we now understand the foreign legal system
better? What has the foreign system taught us? These are
probably some of the most important questions to ask.
The results of comparative observation are likely to be our
window into the world of the foreign culture. Just as importantly,
a look at a foreign culture is just as likely to shed light on our own
legal culture. In effect, we are holding ourselves up to a mirror.
How do the rules of our culture operate? How do our rules
compare to those of a foreign system? Is there something in the
foreign culture that can benefit or lead to improvement of our own
system? 28 Or, upon reassessment, do we conclude that our system
operates effectively?
These will not be easy questions to answer. Much will depend
on the similarities and differences in the legal systems under
review. For example, let us draw upon constitutional law as an
example.
Start with structural governmental issues like
separation of powers. In the United States, separation of powers
at the federal level consists of dividing government into three
separate but equal branches of government (legislative, executive
and judicial). In European countries, separation of powers is quite
different. As in the United States, power is divided between
legislative, executive and judicial branches.
However, the
common European form consists of Parliamentary democracy,
with the Prime Minister or Chancellor being both a member of
Parliament and the leader of the government. That is, the Prime
Minister is both part of the legislature and of the executive
branch. This would be the case, for example, in the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany. In the United Kingdom, the
King or Queen is the titular head of all three branches of
government-legislative, executive and judicial-reflecting English
tradition. Further, the judiciary is not always truly independent
in the sense of being able to rule whether acts of governmental
28

MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 9

(West

2d ed. 1994)(1985) (comparative law can lead to "promoting an improved
understanding of one's own legal system or searching for principles common
to a number of legal systems.").
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bodies are constitutional. This would be the case in the United
Kingdom and France, although the French Conseil Constitutionel,
since 1971, is now moving toward a role of independent judicial
review. 29 And, finally, most European countries are subject to the
supranational law of the European Union and the European
Convention on Human Rights. Thus, in comparison to the United
States, most European countries are subject to two legal orders,
national and supranational. Thus, the European form is not an
easy fit with that of the United States. There are significant
differences that need to be examined and considered carefully and
then explained to see whether understanding or transplanting a
rule will actually work. 30 This is not to say that important
insights could not be gained through comparison.
But the
translation of law from somewhat different legal structures can be
a challenge, requiring deep investigation and explanation.
Contrast this example now with issues of fundamental rights.
Take freedom of speech for example. In the United States, free
speech is textually protected without limitation, leading to a more
absolutist approach. 31 Yet, of course, the Supreme Court does
limit free speech if, under standard methodology, a clear and
present danger is present, now transformed into imminent
harm. 32 By contrast, in most European countries, freedom of
33
speech is protected, but with explicit textual limitations.
29
30

147-56 (1998).
Sometimes a transplant does not work. One example is the attempt

JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAw

by Italy to transplant the United States adversary model in matters of
criminal justice, as documented by Elisabetta Grande in Italian Criminal
Justice:Borrowingand Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 228, 232 (2000).
31
The First Amendment Free Speech provision provides: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
32
For example, advocacy of violence can be regulated, under
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), "where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."
33
For example, under Article 10 of the 1950 European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of which most
European countries are members, freedom of expression is guaranteed as
follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
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Germany lists express limitations on freedom of expression,3 4 as
does Canada, 35 which tends to follow more the European
approach.
Let us focus on obscenity as a form of expression. What is
interesting is that despite the difference in textual constitutional
provisions, the United States' treatment of obscenity contrasts

requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 'authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
EuR. CT. H.R. (1950), Art. 10 (Nov. 4, 1950).
34 The full text of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,
article 5, provides as follows:
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and
disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to
inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources.
Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of
There shall be no
broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed.
censorship.
(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general
laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the
right to personal honor.
(3) Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The
freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to
the constitution.
35
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, freedom of
expression is guaranteed as follows:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982, ch. 11 § 2 (U.K.).
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with that of Germany and Canada. In the United States,
obscenity is unprotected speech under the definition set forth in
Miller v. California.36
By contrast, obscenity is generally
protected speech in Germany in so far as it does not violate the
core norm of dignity or threaten youth. 37 Likewise, obscenity is
mainly protected in Canada unless it demeans women or portrays
violence. 38 Comparatively, we can learn a lot from this example.
Despite textually different treatment of freedom of expression - no
textual limitation in the United States in contrast to textual
limitations in Germany and Canada - obscenity is unprotected
speech in the United States whereas it is largely protected speech
in Germany and Canada. Why is this the case?
In the United States, is it because something lies beneath the
written law that helps drive its formation? Is it morality, religion
or a sense of ethics? We would need a deep investigation of these
underlying cultural aspects to reach a solid conclusion.
36
413 U.S. 15 (1973). Under Miller, obscenity must meet these
standards to be considered unprotected speech:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; ... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
37 See, e. g., 83 BVerfGE 130 (1990).
38 See,
e.g., Regina v. Butler, [1962]
1 S.C.R. 452, 484
(Can.)(unprotected obscene speech is that with "(1) explicit sex with violence,
(2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects people to treatment that
is degrading or dehumanizing"; however, "explicit sex without violence that is
neither degrading nor dehumanizing" is protected speech).
[T]he portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost always
constitute the undue exploitation of sex. Explicit sex which is
degrading or dehumanizing may be undue if the risk of harm is
substantial. Finally, explicit sex that is not violent and neither
degrading nor dehumanizing is generally tolerated in our society and
will not qualify as the undue exploitation of sex unless it employs
children in its production.
Id. at 471. For consideration of Canadian obscenity law, see Grant Huscroft,
The Constitutional and Cultural Underpinnings of Freedom of Expression:
Lessons from the United States and Canada, 25 U. QUEENsLAND L. J. 181
(2006); Kathleen E. Mahoney, Obscenity and Public Policy: Conflicting
Values-Conflicting Statutes, 50 SASK. L. REV. 75 (1985-86); Kathleen E.
Mahoney, The Canadian ConstitutionalApproach to Freedom of Expression
in Hate Propagandaand Pornography,55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1982).
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Summarily stated, religion and its influence on moral standards is
the most plausible explanation for the regulation of obscenity in
39
the United States.
In Germany, the constitutionally protected status of obscenity
would seem to reflect the supreme valuation of a human being as
qua a human being; that is, each person should be free to express
themselves as a constituent element of their personality, itself a
reflection of human dignity, the core animating value of the Basic
Law. Limitations can, most likely, only curtail obscenity if it
violates the core underlying philosophic ideal of the German
constitutional order, human dignity, or the textual limitation of
article 5(2) for "the protection of young people." For example,
human dignity could be violated if the expression depicts violence
or demeans a human being. Treating a person as an object and
not a human violates human dignity. Otherwise, access to
obscenity is left to the choice of people on the idea that sex is a
natural part of human life and, therefore, an integral aspect of
40
human autonomy and personality.

39

Christianity is most likely the driving influence on regulation of

obscenity. In the pre-Christian era, Greece and Rome tolerated rampant
obscenity, a natural aspect of that era of western culture. The Roman led
Under
movement toward Christianity led to regulation of obscenity.
Christian values, sex should only occur as a means of propagation.
Otherwise to engage in sex was considered sinful. See, e.g., Bret Boyce,
Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 304-06 (2008);
Kevin W. Saunders, The United States and Canadian Responses to the
FeministAttack on Pornography:A Perspective From the History of Obscenity,
9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 18, 19, 21-22, 25 (1998-99).
At the founding of the United States, obscenity was treated as the
religious offence of blasphemy. Boyce, supra, at 312. Victorian prudery was
a major influence in the United States and Canada. Id. at 302. After the
Civil War, starting in the 1870s, Andrew Comstock led the movement for
passage of federal obscenity legislation that led to the suppression of sex
speech. Boyce, supra note 39, at 313. While some of the religious fervor
leading to regulation of obscenity has waned, still one of the essences of
obscenity regulation is the "appeal to the prurient interest;" that is, the
triggering of a sexual response. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The sex act is still the
core of obscenity regulation.
40
Mathias Reimann, Prurient Interest and Human Dignity:
PornographyRegulation in West Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 201, 229 (1987-88). Since the 1974 law liberalizing obscenity,
graphic sex material is widely available unless it depicts extreme violence or
Id. at 212.
The law prohibits "extreme hard-core
endangers youth.
pornography . . . sex-related violence, sexual acts by or on children, and
sexual acts of humans with animals." Id. at 216. "[N]otions of sexual
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Canada seems to follow the European model: freedom of
expression is a core element of the underlying dignity of human
beings. Limitations on obscenity are allowed when the expression
depicts violence, or when expression demeans people, no matter
what gender, on the idea that people are to be treated as of equal
worth.
Canada has also moved away from the community
standards norm, still present in the United States,41 and, like
Germany, has jettisoned morality as a basis for regulation. 42
Instead, it has moved to a standard based on harm, mainly
relating to the demeaning of women. 43
In sum, we seem to see different underlying bases for the
treatment of obscenity: in the United States it is most likely
morals and religion; in Germany it is most likely the underlying
philosophic ideal of human dignity; in Canada, it is most likely a
concern for dignity and equality, 44 a competing constitutional
norm with freedom of expression. Accordingly, the United States
stands apart from its western brethren, Canada and Germany,
which are more closely aligned. Interestingly, Canada and the
morality or decency [are not] a sufficient ground for regulation." Id. at 217.
41
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Under Canadian law, the community
standard was applied on a national level, as was done in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957), in contrast to the local community standard
norm set forth in Miller, Butler rejected the community standard. Boyce,
supranote 39, at 301, 335-36.
42 Boyce, supra note 39, at 331.
43 Id. at 335-36, 338. Under Butler, harm is mainly viewed as the
degradation of women. Id. at 338. According to R. v. Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R.
728, 753-54 (Can.), the harm must be "objectively shown beyond a reasonable
doubt" and be so great as "to interfere with the proper functioning of society."
Id. at 750. Specifically, "[t]he causal link between images of sexuality and
anti-social behaviour cannot be assumed," it "must be proved." Id. at 751-52.
No study has yet shown that correlation. Boyce, supra note 39, at 363.
44 As stated by the Court in Butler:
The clear and unquestionable danger of this type of material is that
it reinforces some unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society. The
effect of this type of material is to reinforce male-female stereotypes
to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make degradation,
humiliation, victimization, and violence in human relationships
appear normal and acceptable.
A society which holds that
egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism, and mutuality are basic
to any human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly
justified in controlling and prohibiting any medium of depiction,
description or advocacy which violates these principles.
Id. at 477.
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United States are linked closely by geography and strong elements
of culture. Yet, constitutionally, they differ in important respects,
including over obscenity. By contrast, Germany shares more
common geographic and legal ties to its common members in the
European Union, including over obscenity.
III. CONCLUSION
What is clear is that comparative law is in need of an
overhaul if it is to take its rightful place as an important legal
science, along the lines of the new movements that have developed
over the last thirty years, such as law and economics and critical
legal studies. First, we need to focus on developing and applying a
sound methodology, as employed in law and economics. I have set
forth a four step process: Rule 1 (comparative skill); Rule 2
(evaluation of external law); Rule 3 (evaluation of internal law);
and Rule 4 (comparative observations). There may be better ways
of developing and outlining a sound comparative law methodology.
It would be welcoming if others come up with alternative, if not,
better strategies. We certainly need to assess and reassess the
proper approach.
Comparative law must also take on broader missions. We
need to explore more deeply nonwestern and nontraditional
We need to step outside of our own native
cultures.
predispositions to see if we can learn more from those influenced
by different cultural patterns. Looking outside the west might
have a major influence on personal behavior, communal ties and
support, stewardship of the earth's resources and trading
practices, among other subjects. And comparative law needs to be
employed to help shed insight on major public policy issues, such
as antitrust, consumerism, data privacy, accounting, formation of
corporations and criminal law.
Comparative law should now be set up to serve a new and
important role in the 21st century. Through comparative law we
can embark on a new course as we try to figure out what to do in
our modern, increasingly globally linked world. Comparative law
has a large role to play here. We need to take on these new tasks
as a way to improve human welfare and our legal order, whether
Understanding law and
national, regional or international.
culture is key to understanding people.

